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for the CFSP and ESDP in the early 21st century.
Our three essays will help readers begin to sort it 
out. Richard Whitman (co-chair of the EUSA’s “EU as 
a Global Actor” interest section) offers a clear exposi-
tion of some of the nuts and bolts of CFSP change 
in the Lisbon Treaty. These were both the main CF-
SP-related elements of the Constitutional Treaty and, 
as he observes, are still likely to be implemented in 
some form eventually.  Frédéric Merand considers 
the broader context of military and security integration 
across the member-states, and relates ongoing devel-
opments therein to the broader context of political-sci-
ence theory as well. Historian Piers Ludlow provides a 
different kind of context, surveying the recent literature 
on security and military issues in the early decades of 
the EU project. Whether taken together or read sep-
arately, they provide students and experts alike with 
useful points of departure to untangle the complexities 
of Europe’s evolving framework for external action.
Craig Parsons, EUSA Review Editor
Europe’s Evolving Framework 
for External Action
ever since it became clear that the EU was going to 
pull off its ambitious single-currency deal, in the late 
1990s, EU observers have seen foreign and security 
policy as the most promising realm for the Union’s 
next “big idea.” Despite the longstanding wisdom of 
the “Monnet method”—that integration advances best 
when it steers clear of “high politics”—both European 
elites and cross-national public opinion support Eu-
ropean steps in foreign and security policy as much 
or more than in any other area. But big ideas about 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
have had a very mixed experience in recent years. On 
the one hand, the widespread European rejection of 
the Bush administration’s policies (majoritarian even 
in the countries whose governments decided, often 
for very idiosyncratic reasons, to join the “coalition 
of the willing” in Iraq) seemed to set ever more fer-
tile ground for new EU steps. Moreover, considerable 
military integration has taken place under the political 
radar, further laying the foundations for EU action. On 
the other hand, the governments seem little closer to 
building on these foundations at a political level. Not 
only did they fragment over Iraq, they disagreed over 
recognition of Kosovo—giving the appearance of little 
progress since similar fights in the early 1990s around 
the first Gulf War and recognition of Croatia and Slo-
venia. Various proposals to strengthen the CFSP and 
ESDP did become the most prominent policy-related 
contents of the EU Constitutional Treaty, but they were 
caught up in the political maelstrom around that initia-
tive. The CFSP/ESDP elements were salvaged from 
the Constitution’s wreckage to become key compo-
nents of the Lisbon Treaty, and most observers expect 
they will somehow be salvaged from the Irish rejection 
of Lisbon as well. Still, if broad foundations and some 
elite optimism for EU foreign and security policy have 
survived these years, proponents of a strong EU role 
in this realm may well have the impression of a lost 
decade. Even those with a more positive reading must 
admit it has been very hard to track the prospects 
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lis-
bon Treaty: Significant or Cosmetic Reforms?
Richard G. Whitman
the european union’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP), launched by the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1993, has now been in operation for almost a de-
cade and a half. During that time the CFSP has of-
ten been subject to criticism for its ineffectiveness. To 
address these perceived shortcomings, modifications 
to the policy were introduced under the treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nice. The Lisbon Treaty (LT) follows 
this past trend by introducing a further set of reforms 
to the EU’s arrangements for foreign policy decision-
making and implementation. This article outlines these 
changes and highlights areas of substantive reform.
As of mid-June 2008, when an Irish referendum 
rejected the LT, these CFSP provisions are in an un-
certain state—but they are also back in the headlines. 
The treaty’s foreign policy provisions were a key is-
sue in the Irish referendum debate. That fact itself was 
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not a huge surprise. Indeed, with an eye to potential 
ratification difficulties, two declarations (30 & 31) had 
been attached to the Treaty to provide political cover 
for governments that wished to convey the impression 
that nothing in the Treaty hindered their existing ability 
to define or implement national foreign policy. Clearly, 
these were insufficient to persuade Irish voters that 
Irish neutrality was not under threat. Despite Irish public 
anxieties and despite the fact that the CFSP and ESDP 
provisions account for a substantial proportion of the LT, 
however, its foreign, security and defence policy provi-
sions are not a dramatic departure from past practice. 
Remodeling the Wider Foreign Policy
The LT is a set of amendments to the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Communities, renamed the Trea-
ty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
and The Treaty on European Union (TEU). A substan-
tial proportion of these changes deal with the CFSP 
and ESDP provisions (25 of the 62 amendments). 
Under the LT, the EU’s panoply of foreign policy is 
“rebranded” under the new heading of “External Ac-
tion” replacing the old Title V of the TEU with two new 
chapters. The first of these chapters covers “General 
Provisions on the Union’s External Action” (and con-
tains two new articles 10a and 10b that draw some 
wording from the old TEU art. 11). This chapter pro-
vides an entirely new set of principles and general 
objectives for the wider External Action area and un-
derstood as covering the CFSP/ESDP. In addition, it 
creates a new part V of the TFEU entitled “External 
Action by the Union” (which draws together the old 
EC Treaty provisions covering the Common Com-
mercial Policy, Cooperation with third countries and 
humanitarian aid, restrictive measures, international 
agreements, relations with international organisa-
tions and third countries and Union delegations and 
the solidarity clause) as well as “external aspects of 
its other policy areas.” The second of the two new 
chapters contains the “specific provisions on the 
common foreign and security policy.” The new CFSP 
chapter, running from articles 10c-31 (as opposed to 
11-28 for the existing TEU) is also divided into two 
sections: “Common Provisions” and “Provisions on 
the Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP). 
As a consequence of the division, moving, and 
reordering of treaty articles, the CFSP/ESDP provi-
sions are not only greatly expanded, but also more 
separated out. For example, provisions dealing with 
expenditure matters are moved into the first chapter 
of the Treaty. Those dealing with enhanced cooper-
ation are also removed (and now covered by a new 
Art. 10 for the TEU that covers enhanced cooperation 
across all the Union’s policy areas). Provisions cov-
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ering agreements with third parties and international 
organizations are also greatly streamlined (Art. 22).
Changes to Decision-making 
A second set of changes to the TEU by the LT are 
those amendments that have consequences for the de-
cision-making and implementation of the CFSP/ESDP.
Remaining distinctive
Although there are changes to arrangements for 
the decision-making and implementation, the underly-
ing principle of a distinctive decision-making regime 
for the policy area is retained. The CFSP/CSDP re-
mains a distinctive “pillar” in that the roles of the Com-
mission, European Court of Justice and European 
Parliament are very heavily circumscribed (and ex-
plicitly indicated in a revised art. 11 and in a new art. 
240a of TFEU explicitly spelling out that the ECJ has 
no jurisdiction over the CFSP provisions). Most of the 
existing references to the Commission are removed 
and Commission initiatives on CFSP matters are to 
be directed through the High Representative (art.16; 
see below for more on the “HR” office). The Europe-
an Parliament is also enjoined to increase its annual 
debate on the CFSP to twice per annum and to ex-
pand this debate to encompass the CSDP (art. 21).
Seeking a common approach
There is, however, a substantively new article 
(Art. 17a) making it incumbent on member states to 
seek a “common approach” on matters of foreign and 
security policy and to be pursued by member states 
through their diplomatic representation in third coun-
tries and in international organizations. For example, 
article 19 requires EU members with seats on the UN 
Security Council to use the HR to represent collec-
tive policy where the Union has defined a position. 
It also places greater obligations on Member States 
to ensure that any policies that may be pursued and 
“affect the Union’s interests” require consultation ei-
ther in the European Council or Council and member 
states are required to show mutual solidarity. This 
article may be a “paper tiger” as no provision exists 
to formally sanction non-complying member-states. 
Limited revisions to procedures of decision making
Unanimity remains the norm in decision-making 
except where otherwise explicitly provided for (art. 
17.2), and except for one new addition: where the 
Council is adopting a decision defining a Union action 
or position, on the basis of a proposal “which the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy has presented following a specific re-
quest to him or her from the European Council, made 
on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,” 
the member-states may take decisions by a qualified 
majority. The provision that previously allowed for ma-
jority voting in the implementation of Common Strate-
gies is retained in a revised form (to cover the replace-
ment arrangement noted above) and by still permitting 
implementation of actions or provisions by voting. 
There is also now a provision allowing the European 
Council to adopt (unanimously) a decision allowing 
for the extension of areas covered by majority voting.
Constructive abstention is retained in Art. 17, but 
with the change that the existing blocking minority of 
one third of member-states now also needs to com-
prise at least one third of the population of the Union. 
The “Emergency Brake” is also retained for member-
states opposed to the move to a decision to be taken 
on the basis of a majority vote. The HR is given the 
role to seek a solution for the state concerned before 
the issue would be referred to the European Council.
The existing institutional hierarchy of the CFSP 
is retained with the European Council (unanimously) 
setting broad objectives. The change to the imple-
mentation is that the HR is now given a much more 
prominent role. Common Strategies (and which, in 
recent years, have become a redundant device) 
have been removed from the Treaty. The European 
Council does, however, still retain the role to take 
formal “decisions” to “identify the strategic interests 
and objectives of the Union” (Art. 10b and Art. 13).
Joint Actions and Common Positions are re-
worked within the LT and with the reference now 
to adopt “decisions” taken to facilitate “actions” 
to be undertaken and “positions” to be held by 
the EU and its member-states (Art.s 12, 14, 15). 
High Representative
The most significant set of changes to decision-
making concern the revamped role of the High Rep-
resentative. The “new” High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has al-
ready attracted attention as the post-holder will also 
simultaneously “double-hat” as a Vice-President of the 
Commission (Art. 9e). The High Representative will be 
a personification (another personification will be dis-
cussed below), and the animus, of the new gathering-
together of all aspects of External Action, formally re-
sponsible for its consistency across the Treaties and 
institutions (Art. 9e(4)) and clearly key to achieving the 
ambition of greater synergy across all aspects of Ex-
ternal Action. The HR is appointed by the European 
Council (under majority voting provisions) for the same 
five year term as the Commission and subject to the 
European Parliament vote of consent on the incom-
ing college of Commissioners. The HR will replace the 
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Presidency as the key animating force of the CFSP 
(Art. 16). Consequently a number of changes to the 
TEU concerns the powers and responsibilities of the 
High Representative and place the post holder at the 
centre of coordinating (including within international 
organizations and conferences (Art. 19), directing and 
implementing the CFSP. A new article (13b) sets out 
strengthened responsibilities and powers for the HR, 
which include chairing the (new) Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil (and nominating the chair of the PSC [WHAT IS 
THIS?] under Declaration 3 of the LT), representing 
the Union with third parties and within international or-
ganizations and conferences and providing for support 
through the new European External Action Service 
(EEAS; of which more below). The HR also takes on 
the responsibility (previously exercised by the Coun-
cil) for proposing and managing Special Representa-
tives (Art. 18), the facility to task the PSC with work 
(Art. 23) and replacing the Presidency in represent-
ing the CFSP to the European Parliament (Art. 21). 
External Action Service and Union delegations
One of the most eye-catching innovations of the LT 
is the introduction of the European External Action Ser-
vice (EEAS) tasked with assisting the HR (Art. 13(3)). 
The EEAS is intended as the “28th” diplomatic service 
of the EU and, under the LT provisions, intended to be 
staffed by officials from the General Secretariat of the 
Council, the Commission and staff seconded from the 
diplomatic services of the member-states. The exact 
organization and modus operandi of EEAS is to be 
determined by the Council acting on the basis of a pro-
posal from the HR and after there has been consulta-
tion of the European Parliament and “the consent” of 
the Commission. Preparatory work on the EEAS has 
already commenced under the Slovenian Presidency. 
The current European Commission delegations in third 
countries and international organizations are to be re-
titled Union delegations and placed under the author-
ity of the HR (TFEU art. 188q), but explicit provision 
is not made for them to become a part of the EEAS. 
New provisions on financing
In addition to the existing provisions for charging 
administrative and operating expenditure to the Union 
budget, the LT introduces new provisions covering cir-
cumstances in which the EU may wish to have rap-
id access to the Union budget, in particular for mat-
ters covered by ESDP art.s 27(1) and 28), and, if not 
charged to the Union budget, then chargeable to a 
start-up fund to be financed by the member-states. The 
arrangements to govern both of these circumstances 
are to be determined by the Council in due course (Art. 
26(3)) and on the basis of a proposal from the HR.
Other provisions impacting on the CFSP
Other changes introduced that have implications 
for foreign policy but not contained within the CFSP/
CSDP sections of LT, include the grant of legal per-
sonality to the EU (art. 32 revised TEU—and all ref-
erences to the revised TEU unless otherwise stated) 
and the creation of the position of President of the Eu-
ropean Council. The latter only appears once in the 
CFSP chapter (art 13) on the basis that, “If interna-
tional developments so require, the President of the 
European Council shall convene an extraordinary 
meeting of the European Council in order to define 
the strategic lines of the Union”s policy in the face of 
such developments.” Art. 9b that provides for the cre-
ation of the President of the European Council states:
The President of the European Council shall, at his 
or her level and in that capacity, ensure the external 
representation of the Union on issues concerning its 
common foreign and security policy, without prejudice 
to the powers of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Art. 9b(6)).
Clearly the degree of working harmony (or preju-
dice) established in the relationship between the first 
incumbent President and the HR will be of importance 
and much may depend on the personality of the two 
post-holders and the successful implementation of the 
LT amendments in general will be highly dependent on 
the willingness of the new HR to utilize their powers. 
Whether the member-states will be able to realize 
their ambition for the ratification of the LT to be complete 
for entry into force on 1st January 2009 is now highly 
questionable. However, that the member-states pre-
served the foreign policy provisions of the Constitution-
al Treaty almost intact in the LT provides a clear indica-
tion that these reforms are highly unlikely to be dropped 
whatever agreement is reached with the Irish Republic. 
Richard G. Whitman is Professor of Politics at the 
University of Bath
European Defense Policy and 
International Relations Theory
Frédéric Mérand
the european security and defense policy (ESDP) is 
one of those topics that makes you wonder wheth-
er too many academics are studying too few actors 
who have too little money. After all, we are talking 
of 200-odd EU officials who manage no more than 
a few hundred million euros. Compared to NATO or 
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the German army, the numbers are rather small. On 
the face of it, Andrew Moravcsik may have been right 
when he wrote that ESDP was but a “pipe dream.”
Or is it? When one includes the multibillion euro de-
fense firms that now deal with the European Defense 
Agency on a regular basis and the hundreds of military 
officers who plan EU exercises in their respective de-
fense ministries, one begins to see the importance of 
ESDP. In less than 10 years, the EU has conducted 
almost 20 crisis management operations, some small 
like the border assistance mission in Palestine, others 
big like the 7,000-strong peacekeeping force in Bosnia. 
The European Force deployed to Chad last February 
saw a first soldier, Sergeant Polin, die for the Union.
To carry out these operations, the EU has created a 
host of political-military bodies: the Political and Secu-
rity Committee (COPS), where decision-making takes 
place; the EU Military Committee, which gathers chiefs 
of defense; and an ever expanding EU Military Staff. 
The European Defense Agency, which aims at stream-
lining procurement in what remains an extremely frag-
mented defense market, is ruled by a board of defense 
ministers that uses the ultimate sovereignty taboo: 
qualified majority voting. Despite the many shortcom-
ings of ESDP, no other regional organization has gone 
so far in building its own military arm, and European 
defense is hugely popular, often more so than the EU 
itself. The symbolic dimension of European defense 
was not lost on Nicolas Sarkozy, who declared it to be 
one of the priorities of the French presidency in 2008. 
Understanding ESDP
For a few years after the Saint-Malo Summit, which 
launched the European defense initiative in 1998, there 
wasn’t a great deal of theoretical literature on ESDP. 
Most of the writing was either descriptive or normative. 
The main issues at debate were whether ESDP would 
work, what kind of impact it would have on transat-
lantic relations, and how many precision-guided mu-
nitions or strategic transport aircrafts EU countries 
lacked compared to the US (the answer is: many).
But now the field is booming with new theoretical ap-
proaches to ESDP. Interestingly, most of the literature 
comes not from EU studies but from International Rela-
tions theory. Theoretical explanations fall into the predict-
able camps of realism, liberalism, and constructivism.
Realists long assumed that, without a clear and 
present threat, it was unlikely that European states 
would engage in military cooperation. After the Iraq 
crisis, however, this skepticism gave way to the auda-
cious prediction that ESDP would be used as a way 
for European countries to balance the US. Robert Art 
(2004) and a few realist heavyweights alluded to this 
scenario in a series of papers on soft balancing. But 
it is Seth Jones (2007) and Barry Posen (2006) who 
have explored the balancing thesis more systemati-
cally. In a rigorous book, The Rise of European Se-
curity Cooperation, Jones argues that ESDP is one 
of the strategies used by France, and to a lesser ex-
tent the UK, to simultaneously bind Germany into the 
European order and soft balance against the US. In 
other words, ESDP is the product of multipolarity in 
Europe and unipolarity in the world. Posen goes even 
further: because ESDP is about military capabilities, 
it should be described as a form of hard balancing. 
What the Europeans are doing, he claims, is ready-
ing themselves militarily for when the US will no 
longer underwrite their security or, more ominous-
ly, when they become fed up with US unilateralism. 
The balancing thesis is predicated on the oft-heard 
argument that the Europeans are trying to undermine 
NATO. ESDP would be something like the beginning 
of a rival military alliance. The reality, however, is that 
most EU governments see ESDP as a complement 
to the Atlantic Alliance, and that most of the problems 
in the EU-NATO relationship are caused by a non-
EU country, Turkey, for reasons that have little to do 
with grand strategy. And while realists may provide a 
plausible model to analyze French policy, they look 
much more uncomfortable with the British case, an 
important force behind ESDP since the days of Tony 
Blair and yet one whose behavior does not quite fit 
the balancing thesis—to say the least. To understand 
the British, as always, we better turn to liberalism.
Few liberals have in fact paid attention to ESDP. 
This is surprising, for if there is one area in which 
there are externalities to internalize and economies 
of scale to be made (Foucault 2009), it has got to be 
security and defense, where the waste of duplication 
is plentiful. But liberals have tended to assume that 
these coordinating functions were already taken on by 
NATO. Arousing the interest of liberals has also been 
made more difficult by the fact that there are actually 
few domestic interest groups (with the possible ex-
ception of one or two large defense firms) that have 
really pushed for a European defense policy. Never-
theless, Robert Dover (2007) has recently made a 
compelling case for using liberal intergovernmental-
ism. In The Europeanization of British Defence Pol-
icy, he shows how the UK managed to “upload” its 
preferences for beefed-up, NATO-friendly European 
capabilities at the EU level. ESDP, he argues, has 
been used to lock EU governments into what is es-
sentially a British conception of the security architec-
ture. For Dover, Tony Blair and his entourage promot-
ed ESDP mainly as a means to salvage NATO. Why 
the French swallowed this is far from clear, however. 
Perhaps, then, we are observing a case of con-
6     Summer 2008  EUSA Review
structive ambiguity in which preferences matter less 
than beliefs systems? That, at any rate, is what con-
structivists surmise. Being less interested in the mo-
tives of the British and the French than in the ide-
ational preconditions of a common defense policy, 
constructivists focus on the notion of strategic culture, 
which refers to “the socially-transmitted, identity-de-
rived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are 
shared among the most influential actors and social 
groups within a political community, which help to 
shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pur-
suit of security and defense goals” (Meyer 2006: 20). 
Constructivists disagree among themselves about 
the extent to which a European strategic culture is in 
the making. Bastian Giegerich (2006), for example, 
documents the endurance of national norms and be-
liefs among EU countries. He finds that there remain 
important ideational cleavages between Atlanticists 
and Europeanists, and between those who favor tra-
ditional defence versus those who support force pro-
jection. Howorth (2007), Meyer (2006) and Cornish 
and Edwards (2001), however, argue that there has 
been a certain degree of convergence since 1989 
around threat perceptions. This convergence is at-
tributable to new forms of cross-socialization within 
EU institutions and common learning from the crises 
that plagued the European continent in the 1990s, no-
tably the Balkans wars. For an even more sanguine 
argument, look for Stephanie Anderson’s Crafting EU 
Security Policy. Highlighting the impressive popular-
ity of ESDP in the general public, she argues that 
the creation of a common defense policy is a nation-
building project and that it is, as such, inseparable 
from the development of a common European identity. 
What is ESDP about?
The contributions reviewed are all extremely valu-
able and the purpose of this essay is not to distribute 
good points and bad points. But it seems to me that the 
big picture is missing in these accounts. To be sure, 
European defense represents, in the words of Mark 
Webber and his colleagues (2004: 19), “one of the 
great political revolutions of the late twentieth and ear-
ly twenty-first centuries.” The most striking element of 
this revolution, in my view, is found in the myriad forms 
of social integration that now take place among Euro-
pean armed forces, at the policy but also at the opera-
tional level. This “intensive transgovernmentalism” was 
made possible by what amounts to a quiet denational-
ization of defense policy in Europe. Defence staffs are 
constantly looking for what their counterparts are do-
ing, sharing good practices, emulating each other, and 
meeting with each other – probably more so than health 
or education officials. The endless quest for “interop-
erability” (of materiel, of procedures, of men) means 
that, today, very few defense policies are unaffected 
by European (not necessarily EU) developments.
There is no such thing as a purely British de-
fense policy anymore, let alone a Belgian one. Gone 
are the ideas of launching national procurement pro-
grams (the French Rafale aircraft should be the last 
one) or deploying a stand-alone national contingent 
abroad (again, the French are not expected to repeat 
their 2002 experience in Côte d’Ivoire). In the 21st 
Century, almost operation or procurement program 
has to be justified in the name of European security. 
French and German reforms, which were conscious-
ly undertaken to fit European defense (whatever 
that means) are a case in point. Faced with declin-
ing budgets and a deep existential crisis, European 
armed forces have embarked on a wide-ranging 
strategy of internationalization, in which Brussels 
features prominently (Mérand 2008). ESDP is part of 
that. But so is France’s rapprochement with NATO.
If I am right, we should be careful not to overstate 
the extent to which ESDP constitutes a break with the 
past. In many ways, ours is a story of “Europeanization 
without the European Union” (Irondelle 2003). The re-
ality is that the process of internationalization has been 
going on for a good number of years, largely thanks 
to NATO and the post-1989 growth of multinational 
peace operations. When we think of globalization, the 
military is probably not the first institution that comes 
to mind. Yet in a very real way, European armed forces 
now function like multinational corporations: operating 
most of the time in a multinational context, they rely 
on the same procedures, speak the same language 
(English, that is), and more often than not use the 
same equipment. Through academic exchanges, sec-
ondments, common exercises, joint procurement pro-
grams, policy conferences, language training, technical 
working groups, and above all the continuous prepara-
tion for and conduct of military operations, a transgov-
ernmental security and defense arena has emerged 
in Europe which is quite unparalleled in the world. 
The creation of this transgovernmental arena, 
first around NATO but increasingly around the EU 
in the ESDP framework, means that European de-
fense is above all a space of interaction in which 
new practices and social representations are gener-
ated. The fact that the neutral Swedes and Irish, as 
well as the Germans, have deployed to sub-Saharan 
Africa under a twelve-star flag is just one example. 
In Chad or in the Congo, these soldiers confron a 
post-colonial reality that is new for them, while the 
French must, quite simply, learn to speak English. 
In a way, whether the next French president 
wants to balance against the US or the Europeans 
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get their act together in Afghanistan is quite irrel-
evant: European military integration is here to stay. 
Frédéric Mérand is Assistant Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Montreal
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Foreign Policy and Security in Early European 
Integration: A Survey of Recent Work
N. Piers Ludlow
the desire to use the European integration process to 
boost the member states’ collective clout on the inter-
national stage is as old as the European integration 
process itself. Indeed many historians would argue that 
the realization by Western Europe’s leaders in the wake 
of the Second World War that their countries had lost 
the centrality to world affairs which their predecessors 
had taken for granted constituted one of the key spurs 
to initiate tighter European cooperation. As the Ger-
man Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, is meant to have 
commented to Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister, 
in the aftermath of Britain and France’s combined hu-
miliation at Suez in 1956—perhaps the episode which 
most clearly symbolized the eclipse of Europe’s re-
maining “great powers”—“Europe will be your revenge” 
(Pineau 1976, p.191). But actually realizing this ambi-
tion and devising a European framework which would 
enable the states of Europe to combine their strength 
without sacrificing too much of their prized national 
autonomy has proved a frustrating and difficult task.
The first, and perhaps still probably the best-known, 
demonstration of this fact came in 1954 with the de-
mise of the European Defence Community (EDC). 
The rejection of the ambitious Treaty of Paris by the 
French National Assembly was widely seen as the first 
major crisis of European integration—and of course 
constitutes a timely reminder that problematical ratifi-
cation processes are nothing new in the development 
of European cooperation! Despite its topicality, how-
ever, the EDC episode has generated relatively little 
historical scholarship of late. There have been a few 
national studies that have devoted some space to the 
episode (Hitchcock 1998; Large 1995; Granieri 2003; 
Dwan 2001; Pastor-Castro 2006; Ruane 2000; Mawby 
1999). Skogmar’s The United States and the Nuclear 
Dimension of European Integration (2004) also adds at 
least one important new theory as to why French par-
liamentarians turned against an idea which their own 
government had proposed.  This is to suggest that one 
of the factors behind the French vote against the EDC 
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was the American attempt to use the putative defence 
structure as a means of controlling European access 
to nuclear technology.  France in other words turned 
against European defence so as to protect its national 
right to develop a nuclear deterrent.  And there has 
been one very useful comparative investigation of the 
way in which French and Italian Christian Democrats 
viewed the issue (Risso 2007). But the last volume to 
consider the episode from the point of view of all of the 
states involved was Dumoulin’s somewhat uneven ed-
ited volume dating from 2000. Those wanting to look 
at the episode in detail will therefore be obliged to re-
turn to some of the older literature: Fursdon (1979), 
Warner (1985), Schwartz (1986), and Clesse (1989).
This recent neglect may in part reflect the domi-
nance—in the English-speaking world especially—of 
Alan Milward’s ideas about the origins of the European 
integration process (Milward 1992). For if Milward is 
right to emphasize the economic origins of the Euro-
pean Communities, then the EDC was a deviation from 
the main course of European developments the fail-
ure of which needs little explanation. As the pendulum 
swings back in favour of more political causes, how-
ever, or at very least of explanations which stress the 
complementarity of political and economic motivations, 
then the rise and fall of the EDC project may regain 
importance (see Ludlow 2009 on this trend).  It will still 
have to contend, though, with the way in which most 
contemporary historians tend to be drawn towards the 
very latest release of official government documents. 
Given that most Western European countries operate 
a “thirty-year-rule,” declassifying material after three 
decades have elapsed, this means that interest in the 
1950s has waned to be replaced by a focus on the 
1960s, and now increasingly the 1970s. Much of the 
recent historical writing on the checkered past of Euro-
pean foreign policy and defence cooperation efforts has 
therefore been concentrated on these two decades.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a great deal of this new 
historiography has been devoted to the ever-fascinat-
ing figure of Charles de Gaulle and his vision of a po-
litical Europe.  The French President made a number 
of attempts in his early years in power to persuade his 
partners that the Six member states of the European 
Community should flank their economic integration 
with “political union”—in other words with tighter co-
ordination of foreign policy and perhaps ultimately de-
fence policy. The most famous of these attempts was 
the Fouchet Plan of 1961. The nature of these French 
proposals, their underlying intent, and the reasons for 
which the scheme ultimately failed have been explored 
by Soutou (1999) and Vaïsse (1998). The most recent 
English-language account is Giauque (2002), although 
given this book’s decision to concentrate only on the 
larger European states, this needs to be flanked with 
Vanke (2001) so as to fully understand the opposition 
the French scheme encountered.  The clash between 
de Gaulle’s ideas and those of the Kennedy Admin-
istration in Washington which Giauque does capture 
well, is also covered in Mahan (2002), Bange (2000) 
and Conze (1995). And for a totally different reading of 
the Fouchet Plan, which sees it more as a tactical move 
rather than a genuine attempt to build a more political 
Europe, it is worth also reading Moravcsik (2000). De 
Gaulle”s later more restricted vision of cooperation just 
with the West Germans—his plan B once plan A of six 
power cooperation had been thwarted—has also been 
extensively studied. The most comprehensive studies 
all require a knowledge of either French or German: 
Marcowitz (1996), Lappenküper (2001), Soutou (1996) 
or Schoenborn (2007). But Giauque (2002) does of-
fer some English-language coverage on the French 
side, while Granieri (2003) and Oppelland (2001) 
provide information about the German response.
The desire for foreign policy cooperation was not 
just a Gaullist dream, however. As is made clear in 
Germond (2001) and Ludlow (2006), most of France”s 
partners shared the French interest in greater Euro-
pean foreign policy cooperation, despite disagreeing 
with de Gaulle’s efforts to lessen Europe’s ties to the 
United States. It was therefore unsurprising that re-
newed efforts in the direction of foreign policy coop-
eration should proliferate once the General resigned 
in 1969. One starting point for these post-de Gaulle 
discussions would be the special issue in 2003 of the 
Journal of European Integration History devoted to 
The Hague Conference of December 1969—the mo-
ment when Europe’s “relaunch” after the Gaullist cri-
ses is generally held to have begun. Another would 
be a detailed study of British policy towards the Six 
in the 1967-70 period, which shows how the govern-
ment of Harold Wilson sought to use the widespread 
interest in foreign policy coordination to rally the five 
member states in favour of British accession to the 
Community and to isolate France (Pine 2008). The 
extent of German ambitions in the early 1970s and 
in particular the desire to flank Ostpolitik with an ever 
more effective Westpolitik is very evident in Loth 
(2007). And a fourth valuable source is the latest in 
the series of edited volumes produced by the so-
called Liaison Committee of European Union Histori-
ans which present a cross-section of the most recent 
research on integration history (van der Harst 2007). 
The early years of the European Political Coop-
eration (EPC) process still await comprehensive treat-
ment. Moeckli (2008 forthcoming) is likely to be the 
most detailed study. In the meantime, however, there 
are a number of more specialised studies which zero-
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in on both the successes and the failures of this first 
operational attempt at coordinating the policies of the 
Six and then the Nine. Romano (2007) highlights the 
positive side of the story, recounting the highly suc-
cessful efforts to devise a unified European stance at 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (CSCE). A study of the Dutch and the 1973 oil 
crisis, by contrast, covers the much less fruitful at-
tempts by the Nine to adopt a coherent response to 
the sudden hike in oil prices and demonstrates that 
the fissile effects of Middle Eastern crises on Europe-
an politics long pre-date the Iraq war (Hellema 2004). 
Overall then, there is plenty of historical literature 
which illustrates how deeply the states of Western Eu-
rope have aspired to create an effective mechanism to 
coordinate their foreign policies and thereby to obtain 
a collective foreign policy presence commensurate 
with the EC/EU”s commercial role (the best overview 
is Deighton & Bossuat 2007). But equally clearly the 
historical research on topic underlines that the ongo-
ing problems and controversies surrounding CFSP 
or ESDP are but the latest manifestation of a trend 
stretching back to 1954 at least. The lure of what the 
French term une Europe puissance is undeniable; the 
difficulties of getting there remain painfully apparent.
N. Piers Ludlow is Senior Lecturer in International 
History at the London School of Economics and Po-
litical Science
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 The European Union Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of Europe and the 
European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for its 2009 Eleventh Biennial International Conference, April 23-25 
in Los Angeles, California. This conference also marks the 20th anniversary of EUSA. The Program Committee plans 
to promote the broadest possible exchange of theoretical approaches, disciplinary perspectives and research agendas. 
Please note the following:
1. On the basics of paper and panel proposals:
• We welcome both paper and panel proposals, particularly those that foster transatlantic dialogue. Panel proposals 
need to consist of three to four papers.
• Participants are limited to two appearances on the conference program (two papers or one paper and one discus-
sant role; chair roles do not count toward the appearance limit). Participants should therefore submit no more than two 
proposals.
• For organizational reasons, the program is subdivided into six substantive sections (integration theory, institutions, 
economics and political economy, political sociology, law and public policy, external relations). Please indicate for 
which section you would like to be considered. Note that there is no fixed number of panels for each section. Choos-
ing one section rather than another does not enhance or diminish your chances of having your paper or panel ac-
cepted.
2. On a new presentational format for EUSA 2009:
• For papers that we judge meritorious but which cannot be included in regular panels, we will offer a new format 
instead of poster sessions. In two time-slots during the conference (on Friday and Saturday morning) several papers 
will be grouped in thematic “workshops” around a round table. Presenters will give extremely brief (3-4 minute) state-
ments and then move to discussion. Multiple workshops will run concurrently in a large room, such that visitors can 
move around and sit in on discussions. Our hope is that this format will preserve some of the openness of poster ses-
sions but will provide more substantive interaction. 
3. Teaching workshops:
• EUSA offers two time slots for teaching workshops during the conference. For more information, please refer to 
the call for teaching workshops that will be published separately.
4. Other conditions:
• The Program Committee reserves the right to make changes to organized panel proposals, including their compo-
sition.
• You do not need to be an EUSA member to submit a proposal, but all those appearing on the conference program 
must be current EUSA members.
• We cannot honor individual scheduling requests; by submitting a proposal you agree to be available from 8:30 
a.m. on Thursday, April 23rd through 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 25th.
The 2009 Program Committee is:
Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zurich), Chair
Lisa Conant (University of Denver), Law and Public Policy
Matthew Gabel (Washington University in St. Louis), Political Sociology
Michel Gueldry (Monterey Institute of International Studies), Teaching Workshops
Mark Hallerberg (Hertie School of Governance and Emory University), Economics and Political Economy
Joseph Jupille (University of Colorado), Institutions
Craig Parsons (University of Oregon), Integration Theory
Michael E. Smith (University of St. Andrews), External Relations
The firm deadline for receipt of paper and panel proposals is September 30, 2008. We regret that we cannot con-
sider proposals received after this date. You will be notified of the Program Committee’s decision regarding your proposal 
by December 15, 2008.
How to submit a paper or panel proposal: All proposals must be submitted via our online proposal submission forms, 
which will be located at www.eustudies.org beginning August 4, 2008. Proposals must be submitted via the website. 
We do not accept proposals by e-mail, regular mail or via facsimile. Address all questions about the proposal process to 
eusa@pitt.edu or by telephone to 412.648.7635.
EUSA BIENNIAL CONFERENCE
April 23-25, 2009 
Call for papers and panels
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The European Union Studies Association invites proposals for teaching workshops on 
Europe and the European Union in connection with its 2009 Eleventh Biennial 
International Conference in Los Angeles. 
The teaching workshops are scheduled for Thursday, 23 April 2009 from 8:30 to 12:30 
am and Saturday, 25 April 2009 from 2 pm to 6 pm. Workshops may be planned for two 
hours or four hours and may be offered on Thursday as well as Saturday. The purpose of 
these workshops is to provide participants with tools, methods, materials, sources and 
approaches to teaching the European Union. They should be pragmatic and concrete in 
nature.
Applications for teaching workshops should be sent to eusa@pitt.edu in PDF format. 
The deadline is September 30, 2008.
Applications should include the following information: 
x Target audience: We encourage teaching workshops designed to attract broad and/or 
diverse audiences including high school, community college, and university teachers 
(undergraduate and graduate levels). 
x Maximum participant size of the workshop 
x Preferred time slot 
x Detailed workshop description:  Please include a preliminary teaching plan with 
timetable, subjects, methods, and short reading list. Please describe the expected 
benefits of workshop for participants, including materials, concrete deliverables and 
skills that they can expect to use in the classroom 
x Workshop teachers are encouraged to consider a wide range of active and 
experimental tools, including (but not limited to): use of case studies, simulated 
negotiations and role playing, IT/multimedia and teaching the EU, integration of 
visual and audio sources, use of primary sources, field and service learning, role of 
languages in EU studies, team-teaching, etc. 
x Workshop may address issues such as: classroom activities and techniques, syllabus 
development, student’s evaluation, curriculum development and program assessment, 
etc.
x List of needed didactical equipment 
x Workshop budget: Please detail teachers’ remuneration, cost of equipment, cost of 
materials, etc.  
x CV(s) of responsible teacher(s) 
You will be notified of the Program Committee’s decision regarding your teaching 
workshop proposal by December 15, 2008. Please address all questions about the 
proposal process to eusa@pitt.edu or by telephone to 412.648.7635.
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Are There Any ‘Europeans’ In Europe? 
Attitudes toward the European Union could hardly 
be described as generally admiring, when they exist 
at all in the public mind. Moreover, Europe competes 
with other polities—national, regional, municipal, even 
global—for the affections of people living on the con-
tinent. Of course, most of these have a much deeper 
historical claim on such identities than does Europe. 
So it is not an altogether absurd notion to wonder 
whether any Europeans actually feel European.
Of course, simply to ask this question immedi-
ately plunges us into the elusive domain of identity 
research, and all the problems associated with mea-
suring such recondite attitudinal phenomena. How 
do we define identification? Can it change over time? 
Might it be contextual or situational? Can one individ-
ual simultaneously juggle multiple identities of a po-
litical sort—let alone other religious or cultural ones? 
Can a defined-response survey question ever hope 
to address so emotional and so slippery a question?
Analysis of political identity suggests that it can 
be measured with a acceptable degree of confi-
dence, especially if we are willing to bring multiple 
techniques and data sources to bear on the ques-
tion, and to do so, better yet, in large quantities.
Reviewing existing surveys, I found four basic ques-
tion formats which go to directly to the measurement of 
European identity (there are also many other questions 
posed on related aspects of identity—meaning, depth, 
etc.—discussed below). Table 1 arrays percentage re-
sponses to these identity questions across the decades, 
aggregated by format (since any cross-format comparison 
of responses to different stimuli would be meaningless).
Format One questions asked, “Which of these geo-
graphical groups would you say you belong to first of all?” 
Respondents could choose between their town, their 
region, their country, Europe, and the world as a whole. 
A follow up question asked them to specify their second 
choice from the same list. The second identity question 
format asked respondents “Does the thought ever occur 
to you that you are not only [nationality] but also a Euro-
pean? Does this happen often, sometimes, or never?”
For Format Three, Eurobarometer 41 1 posed to 
respondents the same question described in Format 
Two, but asked them to locate their response on a 
ten point scale — with ‘1’ representing “Not at all also 
European” and ‘10’ being “Very much also European” 
— rather than choosing among the three ordinal re-
sponses. Finally, in the fourth format, inquiries were 
made in separate questions about the respondents’ 
feelings toward the same various geo-polities listed un-
der Format One (town, region, country, etc.). Our in-
terest is in the fourth in this series, asking “How close 
[or attached] do you feel to Europe?” or “the European 
Union?” Respondents could choose between answer-
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the economic and institutional integration of Europe is an 
established fact even if the trajectory of that process of-
ten seems to resemble the punctuated equilibrium mod-
el of evolutionary biology, with Ireland’s rejection of the 
Lisbon Treaty providing only the most recent example.
But what of European mass political identity? And 
does that identity matter?
The answer to the second question is quite likely 
an emphatic ‘yes’, although more challenging times for 
Europe than the relatively munificent and highly pacific 
decades marking the integration journey so far may be 
required to fully test that proposition. As Easton and 
Dennis noted, polities are dependent upon a level of 
“diffuse support [which] forms a reservoir upon which a 
system typically draws in times of crises, such as depres-
sions, wars, and internecine conflicts, when perceived 
benefits may recede to their lowest ebb” (1969: 63).
While the significance question may ultimately need 
to be left for political philosophy to untangle, this study 
responds to the first question, employing a range of em-
pirical data toward addressing several key themes: Are 
there any ‘Europeans’ in Europe? Have their numbers 
changed over time? Who adopts this identity, and who 
doesn’t? What is the nature and content of the identity for 
those who possess it? And how deep does it run? These 
questions are examined in this article, as well as in a 
book-length treatment of the same topic (Green, 2007).
To address these themes, I have employed a multi-
methodological approach, examining a large volume 
of both quantitative and qualitative data. The former 
include every extant survey dataset (Eurobarometer, 
European Community Studies, International Social 
Survey Program, World Values Studies) I could find 
that included an identity-related question. These to-
taled 33 altogether, ranging from 1970 through 2002, 
and including about a quarter-million respondents 
in total (from the pre-enlargements 15 EU member-
states only). I also fielded my own small, non-ran-
dom, survey of likely European identifiers (SEI) in 
1998, which received 271 responses from nationals 
of 31 countries. These quantitative data were supple-
mented by about 150 interviews of both elites and 
targeted European identifiers in order to add greater 
depth to the portrait painted by the statistical analysis.
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ing “Not close [attached] at all”, “Not very close [at-
tached]”, “Close [attached]”, or “Very close [attached]”.
The downside to having these four separate mea-
sures of the same phenomenon is the incomparability 
of the results, which is especially unfortunate given the 
tendency for the formats to have been grouped togeth-
er chronologically, rather than rotated. A perhaps even 
more troubling problem to multiple formats is given by 
the inevitable resulting question: Which one actually 
measures identity? However, there is also an upside to 
this embarrassment of measurement riches – notwith-
standing the unresolved problems just described. The 
good news may be that, while we have no single defini-
tive measure of identity, we are triangulating in on the 
concept more insightfully by using multiple measures.
Those epistemological problems aside, what do the 
figures in Table 1 tell us? Are there any ‘Europeans’ in 
Europe? Clearly, there are. But how should we quantify 
that cohort, especially given variable response tenden-
cies corresponding to multiple question formats? I think 
there are essentially two answers. First, the Format 
One prompt provides the most stringent construct, ask-
ing respondents to choose one polity over other possi-
bilities. In response to this highest hurdle, there seems 
to be a fairly steady five percent or so who choose 
Europe as their primary identity. That is certainly not 
a lot in relative terms, though it is nearly twenty mil-
lion people in absolute terms, far more than the popula-
tion of many of the 15 member-states in the surveys.
Second, if we relax the stringency of the test a little, 
and allow respondents to choose the frequency or de-
gree to which they think of themselves as European, 
or their level of attachment/closeness to Europe or the 
EU, another fairly consistent pattern emerges. These 
data suggest that we might generally aggregate Euro-
peans into three broad categories with respect to their 
European identity. First, there are the core identifiers, 
who comprise something on the order of 15 percent 
of the population. Then, there are another 35 percent 
or so who can be labeled as secondary-level identifi-
ers. The remaining 50 percent of Europeans possess 
little in the way of European identity. (Indeed, some 
proportion of them may even be actively hostile to that 
concept, though the survey data rarely allows us to 
break them out from those who simply don’t identify.)
Altogether, then, yes – there certainly are tens, if not 
hundreds, of millions of Europeans who feel just that re-
garding their political identities, some quite strongly so. 
However, it is equally clear that this remains far from 
a broad majority sentiment, particularly if we measure 
that identity choice using a stringent, hierarchical test.
European Identification over Time
Because the four identity measure formats tend 
to be grouped together chronologically in terms of 
the dates they were fielded, it is difficult to mea-
sure the degree to which the identity has changed 
over time. A much better situation from the per-
spective of addressing that question would have 
been for a single measure to have been employed 
across the several decades since surveying began.
As Table 1 shows, our closest approximation 
to that preference is given by the fielding of the For-
mat One question. In addition to being included in 
early Eurobarometer runs, as well as two predeces-
sor surveys, this question was also asked in the 
three fieldings of the World Values Survey shown in 
the table. Thus, we have data from multiple points 
across the 1970s, along with a snapshot at the be-
ginning of each of the subsequent three decades.
To the extent that is satisfactory for forming a con-
clusion about the longitudinal aspects of European iden-
tity, that conclusion strongly suggests that a remarkable 
stasis is present. In other words, the surveys consis-
tently find a distribution of roughly 5, 12 and 82 percent 
of responses to, respectively, the first, second and nei-
ther choices for Europe when respondents were asked 
which geo-polity they identify with. (The one exception 
is the 2000 round of the World Values Survey, the one 
instance where respondents had the option to actively 
reject a European identity in the question battery. Eigh-
teen percent did so, leaving 66 percent in the category 
who chose Europe neither first nor second. This 18 
percent may represent a decent approximation of the 
number of Europeans who generally strongly reject the 
identity, as opposed to simply preferring other choices.)
While the consistency of the findings here is prob-
ably good news from a methodological perspective, 
suggesting confidence in a measure that is robustly 
reliable, substantively, the data lead to the intriguing 
finding that identity levels in Europe are fairly impervi-
ous to developments on the ground. The thirty years 
from 1971 until 2001 certainly witnessed any number 
of European integration’s more notorious episodes 
of punctuated equilibrium (though perhaps its lowest 
low – the Empty Chair Crisis – and its highest high 
– the successful public conversion to the euro – just 
bracket this period). Interestingly, however, nothing 
much seems to move the meter very far in one direc-
tion or another. And, equally interestingly, neither does 
the accumulation of more sheer public experience 
of the EU over the years, nor generational turnover.
Who Are The ‘Europeans’?
In order to identify measures of association which 
might explain a given individual’s level of identification 
with Europe, I constructed regression models for each 
survey containing a dependent variable measure, and 
introduced a host of independent variables into the 
equations. These latter were employed as indicators 
 Table 1 (Continued) 
	 Identification	With	Europe
 (Percent of Respondents)*
                                                                          SURVEY and YEAR                                                        
DEPENDENT   EB36-0 ISSP EB51-0 EB54-1 EB56-3 EB58-1 SEI¶
VARIABLE   1991 1995 1999 2000 2002 2002 1998
FORMAT FOUR 
 Very Attached/Close    13.1  14.6 19.0 17.3   9.9 10.6  39.7
 Fairly Attached/Close   37.7  38.1 39.6 43.1 31.7 36.0  39.2
 Not Very Att’d/Close    30.2  32.2 29.8 28.2 36.6 36.7  15.8
 Not At All Att’d/Close   18.9  15.1 11.6 11.4 21.8 16.7    5.3
* Percentages are of valid cases only (“no answer” and “don’t know” excluded).  Datasets weighted by country population, and include respondents from EC/EU
 member-states only.  EB = Eurobarometer;  ECS = European Communities Study;  ISSP = International Social Survey Program;  SEI = Survey of European
	Identifiers;		WEVS	=	World	and	European	Values	Survey;		WVS	=	World	Values	Survey.
¶	The	Survey	of	European	Identifiers	(SEI)	is	not	based	on	a	random	sample,	and	cannot	be	compared	to	the	other	survey	data	presented	here.
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	 Identification	With	Europe
 (Percent of Respondents)*
                                                                                          SURVEY and YEAR                                                                                                     
DEPENDENT    ECS   ECS EB06 EB10A EB12 WVS EB27 EB30 EB31 EB33 WVS EB36-0 EB37-0 EB41-1 WEVS SEI¶
VARIABLE        1971  1973 1976 1978 1979 1980-84     1987 1988 1989 1990 1990-93   1991 1992 1994 99-01 1998
FORMAT ONE 
 Eur 1st Choice       8.1    5.9    6.2    4.1    5.1    4.3                        4.9                      3.9  27.1
 Eur 2nd Choice     12.2  13.0  11.8  11.8  13.5    9.0      12.8   11.9  46.9
 Eur Not Chosen    79.6   81.1  82.0  84.1  81.4  86.7      82.2   65.9  26.1
 Eur Rejected              18.3
FORMAT TWO 
 Often       14.2  16.2  14.8  15.8   15.9  14.4    68.1
 Sometimes     35.3 38.3  35.6  31.4   33.6  33.0    27.9
 Never       50.4  45.4  49.6  52.7   50.5  52.6      4.0
FORMAT THREE 
 9-10 (Most Eur)             14.5
 7-8              22.6
 5-6              26.7
 3-4              17.5
 1-2 (Least Eur)             18.8
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for a series of hypotheses falling into four categories.
Attributional hypotheses include those linking 
standard demographic measures, such as age, sex, 
educational level, class, and income, to levels of Eu-
ropean identity. Attitudinal hypotheses do the same 
thing with respect to such constructs as ideology, non-
traditionalism, postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1977) and 
support for integration. Social-psychological hypoth-
eses address concepts like efficacy, instrumentalism, 
socialization and others. Finally, political-cultural hy-
potheses look first at identity by nationality, and then 
substitute concepts such as the size of the country, 
its confessional proportions, its wealth, and other at-
tributes in place of respondent nationality. Altogether, 
about two dozen hypotheses were tested wherever 
relevant measures could be found in each survey, of 
which there were also nearly two dozen examined.
Needless to say, this array produced far too a 
large volume of findings to fully present here, a quan-
tity made even more expansive by the fact that many 
of the hypotheses employed multiple variables to 
measure the relationship in question. However, some 
brief highlights from the findings include the following:
 
• Individuals who are more likely to possess 
a European identity include: elites, cosmopolitans, 
males, postmaterialists, Catholics, those with left and 
centrist ideologies, those who perceive instrumental 
benefits from European integration, and those who 
hold a normative belief in the value of integration.
• Additionally, there are positive though less robust 
associations between European identity and: high levels 
of political efficacy, membership in a religious and/or re-
gional minority group within respective member-states, 
and nationals of countries that more recently joined the EU.
• Countries whose populations tend toward 
significantly higher in levels of European identifica-
tion include France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and 
Austria. Conversely, significantly lower levels of Eu-
ropean identity are found in the Netherlands, Den-
mark, Ireland, Britain, Greece, and Finland. The re-
maining cases are more ambiguous, either because 
of variability in the direction of the effect, or because 
of a lack of statistically significant differentiation 
from baseline countries (thus suggesting that these 
countries are toward the center of the distribution). 
These are Belgium, Germany, Portugal and Sweden.
• Some factors that were hypothesized to asso-
ciate positively with European identification levels but 
actually did not include age, nontraditionalist attitudes, 
country size, or national legacy from World War II.
• Finally, socialization processes and leader-
ship effects were also hypothesized to affect Euro-
pean identity, but only limited quantitative data was 
available to test the former, and none to test the latter.
The Nature and Content of European Identity
We know that some people identify with Eu-
rope, and we can even predict to a certain de-
gree who might fall into that category. But what is 
the meaning of the identity for those who posses it?
To begin with, even the idea of a singular content to 
European identity is itself contested. Only slightly less 
than half of those surveyed even agreed to its existence.
Beyond that, the notion of peace was referred to 
most frequently by those surveyed. Other attributes 
included a shared sense of culture, democracy, hu-
man rights and economic solidarity. For those who 
don’t much identify as Europeans, there was a ten-
dency to define the identity in terms of instrumental 
benefits to be had from integration, while for those 
who do identify with Europe, shared history and a 
common heritage are frequent ascribed themes. Iron-
ically—given that exclusivity is commonly seen as 
integral to nationalism and most other forms of politi-
cal identity—diversity, multiculturalism and tolerance 
are important aspects of European identity, especial-
ly to subscribers. Could you add a phrase to suggest 
what is ironic about this, or replace/strike “Ironically”? 
Finally, what is in some ways the most intriguing 
characteristic of this identity was perhaps best summa-
rized by one such identifier interviewed for this project, 
when she said “Europe is something that rings a bell in 
your mind, but not in your heart. It doesn’t have a spirit.”
What she was pointing to is the identity’s cerebral, cog-
nitive, nature, which is far different from the highly emo-
tive, often involuntarily so, qualities typically associated 
with nationalism and local or regional identities. Many of 
those who identify with Europe seem to do so because 
they have rationally calculated that integration’s devel-
opment and salience are the crucial ingredients neces-
sary for continued peace and prosperity on the continent.
In short, Europeans tend to love their nations and 
localities, sometimes unconditionally, while Europe they 
instead appreciate—and even then, rather conditionally.
The Depth of European Identity
A final aspect of European identity worthy of 
consideration concerns its depth of sentiment. This 
notion—like so many surrounding the topic—is dif-
ficult to operationalize and measure. However, sure-
ly the idea of willingness to sacrifice comes close 
to at least a major core meaning of identity depth.
Especially given that Europe is a relatively new ac-
tor amongst alternative polities, religions and other calls 
upon identity and sacrifice pressing upon individual Eu-
ropeans, and that it is a rather vague and remote phe-
nomenon, it is remarkable that survey respondents and 
interviewed informants do in fact express a willingness 
to make sacrifices for Europe. They are about equally in-
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clined to sacrifice for Europe as for their religious faiths, 
and not terribly less willing to do so than for their coun-
tries. About half of them are willing to make sacrifices for 
other Europeans, and a robustly consistent 80-90 per-
cent are willing for their national governments to do so.
Once again, however, interviews with Europhiles 
reveal that—even among this population—this willing-
ness to sacrifice takes on a very rational, cognitive fla-
vor. For example, on the question of taxes, these infor-
mants tend to see little difference between paying the 
dues necessary to provide for services at the national 
or European level. They want transparency and effi-
ciency in the administration of such programs, but they 
otherwise support the concept equally at either level.
What Is The Significance of European Identity?
European identity is something different in a 
world used to nationalisms and other passion-
ate affinities, making its interpretation challenging.
Is it simply sui generis - an identity like 
no other - static and limited in its popular-
ity, unique in its emotionally dessicated nature?
 Or would it look the same as other identities, were 
we to have taken a snapshot of those at a similarly 
early juncture in their development? Is Europe waiting 
for some great war or other catastrophe, some char-
ismatic figure, or some great breach in relations—say 
with the United States—to shift its identity into a higher 
gear, and thus give it a more traditional appearance?
There is a third possibility, as well, which is that 
the Europeans have adopted a new, vanguard form 
of political identity, replacing the powerful, passion-
ate, nationalisms of old with something of a more 
diffident, considered and reciprocity-based nature.
If so, this would not be the first time that Europe-
ans pioneered some new construct in international 
politics (not least including nationalism, itself). And, 
given the oceans of blood spilled in the name of ear-
lier types of political identity, this new form could 
represent a welcome gift to other parts of the world.
David Michael Green is Associate Professor of Politi-
cal Science at Hofstra University
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lution bring coherence and clarity in the Union's rela-
tions with third countries? In her view, it was not clear 
how the new “High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” would be able to 
accomplish multiple assigned tasks in practice. The 
President of the European Council is a position that 
changes fundamentally the original institutional design 
begging many serious questions: Will the Union's evo-
lution, including the prospect of future enlargements, 
bring about crises that spur integration further? Will the 
tension between the decisions elites make to reform 
the original Treaties and a citizen's understanding of 
the Union's purpose in the world today grow stronger? 
How is a European Union of 30+ member states to 
articulate a strategic culture? These were only some 
of the questions yet to be addressed that made her 
uncertain as to the Union's direction as a global actor 
in this century. Answers to these questions are depen-
dent on the leadership ability of the present genera-
tion to address these difficulties in a timely manner.
The Global War on Terror 
Tom Seitz noted that The “Global War on Ter-
ror,” as it has been known in the USA, opened a new 
chapter in security cooperation between the US and 
Europe. However, after an initial, post-September 11, 
2001 feeling of common purpose, cooperation has 
been a bit bumpy and uneven on a practical level. 
Much friction between the US and the EU has 
stemmed from serious, yet relatively unexplored dif-
ferences regarding the very nature of the threat em-
bodied in the “war on terror.” Given these differences, 
it is hardly surprising that the US and EU differ over 
how to address this threat. One example is the oft-
voiced debate over whether it is appropriate to refer 
to the effort as a “war” at all. On one hand, this dif-
ference stems from different approaches to terror-
ism in particular and security in general in recent 
history. This experience has predisposed the Ameri-
cans to see the terrorist threat as foreign in nature, 
one to be met and dealt with as far from American 
shores as possible, while Europeans are more like-
ly to see terrorism as local or even “home grown,” 
and, thus, a Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) matter. 
At the same time, there are bureaucratic impedi-
ments to increased cooperation. The expansion and 
enhanced role of EU institutions and “cross pillariza-
tion” represented in the increasingly external character 
of internal security policy coincides with the massive 
reorganization of Washington bureaucracy that has 
created the new, post-9/11 Department of Homeland 
Security. However, EUROPOL is not equivalent to the 
FBI. On both sides of the Atlantic, officials are reas-
sessing the nature of their own responsibilities as well 
EUSA EU as a Global Actor
 Interest Section Essay
Interest Section Sponsors Symposium on 
Transatlantic Relations with EU 
Ambassador John Bruton
Stephanie Anderson
in a symposium sponsored by the EU as a Global Ac-
tor interest section and hosted by the University 
of Wyoming, European Union Ambassador John 
Bruton, former prime minister of Ireland, gave the 
keynote address and presided over a panel dis-
cussion called “Strengthening US-EU Relations: Na-
tional and Local Approaches.” As Bruton explained:
 
Such events remind us that our world is getting 
both smaller and larger. Globalization has helped 
us in Europe and America to be better off than we 
have ever been. But it has also helped many mil-
lions elsewhere to live our high-consumption life-
style and this overstretches global supplies of en-
ergy and food, and contributes to climate change. 
How can we—the EU and the U.S., those of us 
who have historically benefited most from global-
ization—work together and with other countries 
to address today's greatest challenge, developing 
sustainable and environmentally responsible econ-
omies? The transatlantic alliance is still the key 
motor of global economic growth, trade, and pros-
perity and we already collaborate widely to develop 
international standards, whether in terms of com-
bating intellectual property violations, liberalizing 
trade, or fighting terrorism and transnational crime.
While all the panelists agreed that an US-EU 
partnership could create international standards 
and provide solutions for the world, the panelists 
worried that asymmetries in structures and, some-
times, outlook could stymie such cooperation. Co-
lette Mazzucelli, Tom Seitz, and Stephanie Anderson 
all discussed organizational asymmetry issues with 
direct effects on cooperation in the foreign and se-
curity policy spheres. Ed Barbier, Mark Northam, Ed 
Bradley, and Robert Field all discussed how despite 
similar goals, the US and the EU are allowing asym-
metries in outlook to undermine cooperation in eco-
nomic, energy, agricultural and environmental policy.
Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Colette Mazzucelli was especially concerned over 
the impact of the Lisbon Treaty’s new architecture for 
the Union in its external relations' representation and 
its impact on future US-EU relations. Would this evo-
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as the nature of the terror threat. It seems reasonable to 
hope that this reassessment could give rise to greater 
cooperation, so long as communication is maintained 
between security organizations in the US and the EU. 
Differing perceptions of the threat must be discussed 
between the two partners, lest security “cooperation” 
becomes nothing more than a dialog of the deaf.
EU-NATO Relations
Stephanie Anderson argued that needless “beau-
ty contests,” for example whether the EU or NATO 
was better suited to act in Darfur, were undermining 
vital transatlantic cooperation in the security sphere. 
She noted that the weekly meetings between the 
EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and 
NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) last less than 
thirty minutes including hellos and good-byes. The in-
ability of this committee to conduct business is even 
more shocking when one considers that sixteen of 
representatives are “double-hatted,” in other words, 
are one-in-the-same person, as they are simultane-
ously the ambassadors to both the EU and NATO.1 
In her eyes, the problem lay in America’s domi-
nance in NATO. NATO’s structural and ideologi-
cal problems were mutually constitutive. Ultimately, 
no amount of reform could change the US position 
from that of leader of the Atlantic Alliance to that of 
mere contributing member. The US has overshad-
owed its European partners. As a result, “theologi-
cal” problems arise as to whether Europe can be 
“European” while enmeshed in the Atlantic Alliance. 
While “tweaking” can facilitate smoother coopera-
tion between these organizations, the ideological 
problem will remain as long as the US is a member.
Challenges and Opportunities in EU-US Econom-
ic Relationships
Edward B Barbier argued that the transatlantic eco-
nomic relationship faced three fundamental challenges.
First, the European Union and the United States 
had to recognize that they had a common interest 
in working together to negotiate the changing struc-
ture of the world economy. Until now, the three “pil-
lars” sustaining the global economy have been the 
United States, the European Union and Japan. To-
day, four new global economic powers are emerg-
ing, China, India, Russia and Iran, due to their 
dominance of world energy markets, their efforts to 
develop economically, and their global ambitions. 
Second, studies have shown that sustain-
ing growth in the advanced European Union and 
US economies is dependent on technological in-
novation and expanding human capital (i.e., edu-
cating and training the workforce). The EU-US 
economic relationship should be built on cooperat-
ing and collaborating to achieve this shared goal.
Third, despite the common challenges faced by 
the European Union and the United States, problems 
arising within their economies through increased glo-
balization and structural change could lead to pos-
sible EU-US conflict. These included differences 
over agricultural and monetary policies, health care 
and social safety nets, immigration, and the envi-
ronment (including global climate change). Resolv-
ing any disputes arising from these differences is 
imperative for the wider, shared goal of maintaining 
and enhancing the EU-US economic relationship.
Energy policy
Mark Northam was adamant that the EU and 
US must share in the R&D costs to discover new 
clean energy options. Seeing a fairly high degree 
of overlap in research programs, he argued that 
American and European collaboration would un-
doubtedly result in better utilization of funds and 
more rapid deployment of advanced technologies. 
Northam warned that global energy markets were 
changing rapidly. While the United States and Europe 
used to dominate non-Middle Eastern energy supplies, 
sources of supply were now moving more dominantly 
to under-developed nations. The US and Europe also 
dominated demand, but, today, the greatest demand 
growth was occurring in the Far East. Supply of conven-
tional energy resources may fail to meet demand in the 
near future with important impacts on our economies. 
The EU and US could both benefit from coopera-
tive research into clean alternatives to conventional oil 
and gas. Each group has complementary strengths to 
bring to the table. He suggested the following areas 
for cooperative research: Wind turbine design; smart-
grid technologies; coal gasification—surface and sub-
surface; gas to liquids conversion; enhanced oil and 
gas recovery; and carbon capture and sequestration.
Agriculture
Ed Bradley recognized that differences in the po-
sitions of the United States and European Union on 
agriculture currently are less pronounced than at any 
time during the past 20 years. The trade distortions 
once attributable to European agricultural policy have 
been declining under the successive Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) reforms of 1992, 1999 and 2003. 
These reforms and recent price increases in world 
commodity markets created an environment condu-
cive for US-EU cooperation on agriculture. While ag-
ricultural trade liberalization still has been a stumbling 
block with the Doha round, North American-European 
disagreements have been mild compared to those 
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between the developed and developing countries.
Agriculture however remains a source of stress 
in US-EU relations. Long unresolved trade disputes 
regarding products produced with growth hormones 
and genetically modified organisms still aggravate 
relations.  Furthermore, creative efforts to resolve 
such disputes appear advisable. Producers in the 
American and European food industries believe 
their goods offer high value and safety. Neverthe-
less, consumers, particularly European consumers, 
express skepticism over the adequacy of industry 
practices and government regulation. Consumers are 
demanding more food safety assurances, yet trade 
treaty obligations require the nations also better har-
monize product standards. Benign neglect of food 
standard harmonization could easily damage inter-
national relations because divergence in standards 
acts as a non-tariff trade barrier.  Sustained creative 
effort to resolve these challenges appears advisable. 
Environmental policy
Robert Field noted that both Europe and the Unit-
ed States have tried to mitigate the effects of air, water 
and soil pollution through legislative action with mixed 
results. Environmental protection through limit val-
ues has provided a common approach in the protec-
tion of air quality in both the United States (US) and 
the European Union (EU) through provisions of the 
Clean Air Act in the US and Air Quality Directives in 
the EU. However, in recent years, the main contrast 
of environmental protection has been the application 
of the precautionary principle. This allows for precau-
tionary measures when an activity raises threats of 
harm even if cause and effect relationships are not 
fully established scientifically. In the European Union, 
phthalates have been banned from plastic products in 
order to protect children from exposure through toys to 
potential health impacts, including cancer. The US En-
vironmental Protection Agency has not followed suit 
as risk assessments have not demonstrated a clear 
direct health impact. The approach of the EU and US 
to climate change has until recent times shown a simi-
lar divergence. The control of carbon dioxide levels 
will continue to be the main area of transatlantic en-
vironmental debate. A common approach is important 
as environmental standards are closely tied with trade 
and the standard of living. For nations to change their 
behavior actions will need to be set within an agreed 
international framework. Meeting the climate challenge 
will require a global policy that includes the US and EU. 
Conclusion
While all recognized the rocky road ahead, Terri 
Rittenburg spoke for all when she expressed hope 
and optimism in the transatlantic relationship: “Con-
sidering the importance of the US-EU relationship, it is 
imperative that we find more effective ways of working 
out our disagreements. As an observer, I note frequent 
trade disputes, particularly over agricultural products. 
As friends and allies, I hope we can develop better 
ways of dealing with these issues to sustain this excel-
lent partnership and benefit all of us.”Bruton agreed, 
noting that, “We can invest in the future of the trans-
atlantic relationship by encouraging academic mobility 
between the U.S. and the EU through programs like 
Erasmus Mundus and ATLANTIS. It is students like 
those I met at the University of Wyoming who will build 
on our actions today in the world of tomorrow, and we 
must prepare them to do it together.” EUSA can fa-
cilitate such interaction. Recognizing the “large and 
diverse transatlantic membership” of EUSA, Bruton 
was impressed with how scholarly interest in trans-
atlantic affairs is thriving, as is the interest section.
Stephanie Anderson is Assistant Professor of Politi-
cal Science at the University of Wyoming and Co-
Chair of the EU as Global Actor Interest Section
Endnotes
1 Nineteen of the EU member states are also mem-
bers of NATO. Of these countries, sixteen appoint a 
single “double-hatted” person to represent the coun-
try’s interest both at the NAC and the PSC.
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EUSA Public Policy Interest Section 
Essay
Food Security and the Future of CAP Reform
Wyn Grant
there are conflicting forces supporting and opposing 
further reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
as global food supply experiences a more turbulent pe-
riod, leading to renewed concerns about food security. 
This was a discourse that shaped the original formula-
tion of the CAP in the 1950s, given vivid memories of 
food shortages in Europe in the immediate post-war 
period and the context of the Cold War.  Those postwar 
conditions led to fears about interruptions of supplies 
of food by sea.  One response was to use the CAP to 
move Europe as far as possible towards self-sufficien-
cy in relation to temperate zone goods.  In this connec-
tion, it is interesting to note that in 2007, the EU export-
ed €75bn of produce and imported €77.3bn. France's 
trade surplus with non-EU members was €8.3bn. In 
other words, given that Europe cannot produce tropical 
zone products, it now has a surplus of temperate zone 
products with France—a major agricultural exporter. 
The European Commission’s current ‘Health 
Check’ reforms are not intended to bring about a wide-
ranging reform of the CAP of the type initiated in 2003 
but rather are seen as a “tidying up” exercise prior to 
a renewed discussion of more fundamental reforms 
in the period up to 2013.  From the perspective of the 
Commission, the aim of the “Health Check” is to as-
sess the experience of the 2003 CAP reform, and to 
introduce adjustments that simplify and increase the 
effectiveness of the policy, allowing it to respond to 
market opportunities and face new challenges such 
as climate change.  As farm prices rise, there are in-
creased pressures for the removal of subsidies, but 
forceful arguments are also being made for their 
perpetuation in a changed global food market. The 
discourse of food security has returned to the fore.
There has been a significant shift in the supply and 
demand balance in the global food market in the last 
year.  On the demand side, as emerging countries such 
as China become richer, the composition of the diet of 
their populations changes in a way that leads to more 
consumption of grain.  For example, as people eat more 
meat, more animal feed is needed for livestock.  As they 
drink more beer, more barley needs to be supplied to 
produce the beer. This shift in demand is not likely to 
go into reverse: rather, the trend is likely to continue.
On the supply side, the quantity of food crops be-
ing produced has been adversely affected by grow-
ing demands for bio-fuels, although questions have 
been raised about whether they are as environmen-
tally advantageous as has been claimed.  Supporters 
of bio-fuels would claim that they have been treated 
as scapegoats for more fundamental problems of food 
supply. Adverse weather conditions have affected 
grain production in some countries, e.g., a long-term 
drought reduced production in Australia.  Some would 
argue that these extreme weather events reflect longer-
term changes in climate triggered by global warming.
Whatever the root causes, the consequence of 
reduced supply and increased demand has been in-
creasing and volatile prices, although there have been 
actual shortages of food in some developing coun-
tries, sometimes exacerbated by hoarding to take ad-
vantage of price rises.  One policy response in, for 
example, Argentina has been to impose export taxes 
on food with the stated objective of ensuring domes-
tic supply, a policy that has encountered substantial 
resistance from farmers there.  In principle such poli-
cies should open up new third country export markets 
for EU farmers and further weaken the case for main-
taining export subsidies which the EU has provision-
ally agreed to phase out by 2013.  The “dumping” of 
subsidized goods in third world markets has been 
particularly damaging to local farmers who have often 
been unable to compete with the imported produce.
The defenders of CAP subsidies argue that Eu-
rope needs to aim for self-sufficiency in food as far 
as practicable and that subsidies are required to en-
sure that production within Europe is maximized. 
There is a revival of old style “productionist” argu-
ments that had been somewhat displaced by an em-
phasis on the environmental costs and benefits of 
farming in recent years.  Those who consider that 
subsidies should be phased out counter these argu-
ments by pointing out that a tighter global supply-
demand balance should lead to an improvement in 
farm profits, although farm organisations claim that 
improved commodity prices are offset by increased 
input prices, particularly for fertilizers and fuels. 
Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that 
farm incomes are increasing, albeit from a low base.
Opponents of subsidies argue that the analogy of-
ten made with energy security is a false one as in that 
sector there is a problem of monopolistic suppliers, 
particularly of gas.  This is not the case in food.  If food 
prices rise because of shortage, more marginal land 
could be brought into production (assisted in the EU 
by the end of set aside) or efficiencies in production 
could be sought through enhanced technology and im-
proved agronomic techniques.  In any case, a general 
subsidy such as the Single Farm Payment (SFP) is a 
blunt instrument in achieving particular policy goals. 
Nevertheless, the arguments about food secu-
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rity have had an influence on decision-makers and 
have been taken up in recent speeches by member 
state politicians and also by the EU Farm Commis-
sioner, Mariann Fischer Boel.  A study of food secu-
rity as part of a broader paper on food policy by the 
Strategy Unit of the UK Cabinet Office (Cabinet Of-
fice, 2008) takes a balanced approach to the risks, but 
does point to the short-term vulnerability of modern 
global distribution systems to any disruption in supply.
The proportion of EU spending devoted to the CAP 
was as high as 81 per cent in the mid-1980s.  More re-
cently, it has been declining slowly, from 49 per cent of 
overall allocated expenditure in 2003 to 46.7 per cent 
in 2006 and is expected to fall further by 2013.   France 
alone receives just over 20 per cent of all expenditure. 
The ten states that joined in 2004 received 9 per cent 
of overall CAP funding in 2006, including over a quar-
ter of the Rural Development Budget.  Their share will 
increase as subsidies are phased in.  Some have very 
small farm sectors, e.g., Malta, but those with large farm 
sectors, e.g., Poland, are likely to resist radical reform.
The CAP Health Check
The proposals put forward in Novem-
ber 2007 by the Commission were intentionally 
modest, representing an extension of the log-
ic of the 2003 reforms.  The key elements were:
• More use of “decoupling,” i.e. separating sub-
sidies from production. France has made particular 
use of continued coupling.
• Move to SFPs based on hectares rather than 
historical payments.
• Increase in compulsory modulation, i.e., shift 
of money from farm support to the “second pillar” of 
rural development.
• Permanent removal of the “set aside” obliga-
tion which has been temporarily suspended.
• Removal of almost all remaining intervention 
and supply control measures.
• Export refunds not to be extended beyond 
2013.
• “Capping” payments to larger farms, but this 
would have hit Britain and Germany and has been 
dropped, but these farms will be subject to a higher 
modulation rate.
The Health Check will have to be finalized at the end 
of 2008 under the French presidency.  If it is not, it is like-
ly to be subject to the co-decision procedure once the 
Lisbon Treaty comes into force which will make reform 
more complicated.  The French presidency will proba-
bly try to get a deal in November as it can then include 
some direct reference to the Health Check in its final 
Summit conclusions.  This would provide wording that 
would support French ambitions in the 2009 review of 
the EU budget to maintain high levels of CAP spending.
Obstacles to reform
Farmers’ organizations are well organized and po-
litically skilled. They have deployed food security argu-
ments very successfully to reinforce the case for sub-
sidy. Their members are still highly reliant on subsidies 
which often account for most of farm profits. Germany 
has a CSU Bavarian farm minister sympathetic to farm 
interests. Consumer and taxpayer interests in CAP re-
form are more diffuse and sporadic.  Nevertheless, 
there is pressure within the EU to reduce spending on 
farm subsidies to make available funds to spend on re-
search and development and innovation which is seen 
as more central to Europe’s economic future.  The battle 
over the budget will therefore take center place again.
France and the European Commission have 
clashed over the future of farming with the European 
Commission dismissing French calls to curtail food im-
ports as self-defeating and backward-looking. “Autarky 
is not the future. We are not aiming at a closed market 
where we are self-sufficient,” a spokesman for farm 
commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel stated.  French 
farm minister Michel Barnier favours domestic produc-
tion and requiring imports to match EU welfare needs 
- moves the spokesman said would invite retaliation: 
“It is not in our interests to become a fortress. If we 
erect new barriers, so will our trade partners,” he said. 
“We are a major trader in agricultural products. We are 
the biggest exporter and importer of farm products in 
the world. What we believe in is trade. We are seeing 
increasing exports of our high-quality food products.”
New protectionism
French proposals on “European preference” that 
are expected to be circulated to agriculture ministers 
next month have been gaining support.  The notion 
that developing countries should adhere to the same 
standards as European producers might seem fair in 
terms of a “level playing field,” but they do not have 
the resources or expertise to meet them and hence 
would face a major barrier in the European market. 
For many of these countries agricultural exports offer 
the best route to prosperity which would then enable 
them to import more manufactured goods.  Neverthe-
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less, the French position has considerable political 
support as EU farmers complain that their costs are 
increasing because of increased environmental and 
animal welfare rules that the rest of the world do not 
have to meet. After a recent vocal campaign by cattle 
farmers, the Commission restricted imports of beef 
from Brazil, where foot-and-mouth disease is rampant.
  The French view, as put forward by Michel Barni-
er, is that “What we are now witnessing in the world 
is the consequence of too much free-market liberal-
ism. We can't leave feeding people to the mercy of 
the market. We need a public policy, a means of sta-
bilisation and intervention.”  This reveals the funda-
mental difference between British and French per-
spectives. Britain has a history of liberalism, France 
one of state intervention and protectionism. From a 
British perspective, the market is an effective way 
of transmitting consumer preferences through the 
price mechanism. The market should be able to sup-
ply food like any commodity. The only qualification is 
the effect that weather fluctuations have on produc-
tion. But this does not justify an elaborate apparatus 
of subsidy and protection, rather the development of 
new and innovative mechanisms for offsetting risk.
Conclusion
Recent increases in food prices have at the same 
time reduced the argument for non-targeted farm 
subsidies, but also revived food security arguments. 
We are unlikely to see the revival of largely discard-
ed policy instruments such as intervention storage. It 
was costly, there were always problems about dispos-
ing of the accumulated surpluses without disrupting 
markets, and some products deteriorated over time, 
leading (for example) to the sale of “ageing” butter to 
the former Soviet Union.  France is focusing rather 
on taking a hard line against substantial tariff reduc-
tions in the Doha Development Round and perhaps 
even removing agriculture from the ambit of the World 
Trade Organization altogether.  It is also likely to in-
sist on the continuation of the SFP in some form. 
Through the strategic vision and tactical skill of 
Franz Fischler as farm commissioner, the 2003 Mid 
Term Review was used to deliver a substantial reform 
of the CAP (Swinnen, forthcoming). Current circum-
stances, in particular the suspension of the Doha 
Round, do not provide such a window of opportunity 
and to some extent productionist discourses of food se-
curity have gained ground over those newer discours-
es focused on food quality and safety, quality products 
and animal welfare, encompassed in the concept of 
multi-functionality.  Major reform is not likely in the next 
five years, but budgetary pressures will not go away.
Wyn Grant is  Professor of Politics at the University 
of Warwick
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Sam-Sang Jo. European Myths: Resolving the 
Crises in the European Community/European Union.  
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007.
sam-sang jo proposes an analysis of the resolution of 
crises in the EU by focusing on the “why” rather than 
on the “how.” He does so in particular by emphasizing 
the central role of myths rather than interests as the 
“stanza” of regulation in the European political system. 
Through its founding myths (peace, reconstruction...), 
defined as unconscious structures based on shared 
historical experiences wich lead elites to reach com-
promises by going beyond immediate advantages and 
differences of interests, the European Union is seen as 
capable of regulating its conflicts and, consequently, 
of enforcing the choice of more and more integration.
Jo thus synthetises the history of European inte-
gration as “a narrative of crises generated and crises 
resolved” (p. 2) and deepens this hypothesis through 
studying four empirical cases: the empty chair crisis 
(1965-1966); the monetary and oil crisis of the 1970s; 
the British budgetary dispute in the 1980s; the rejec-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty by Denmark in 1992. 
Each time, a solution was found to solve the crisis, 
a solution which in turn actually allowed the EU to 
deepen. This leads Jo to the the mixed conclusion 
that although the EU has a strong and effective prob-
lem-solving culture, the slow decay of its regulating 
myths put the future of the European system in doubt.
More generally, Jo’s approach constitutes an at-
tempt to cover a perceived gap in mainstream theories 
of European integration. Intergovernmentalism and its 
focus upon bargains between governments to explain 
the permanent dynamics of European integration is 
seen as too static. Functionalism and transactionalism 
are seen as providing more dynamic explanations, but 
do so in a linear fashion which does not match the 
actual path followed by European integration. High-
lighting the underlying frameworks of meaning influ-
encing political choices is thus presented as a means 
of taking into account both periods of momentum and 
times of latence. From a theoretical point of view, 
Jo claims to share strong proximity with contructiv-
ism, “the most interesting development in integration 
theory” (p. 19). Indeed, like other constructivists, Jo 
seeks to understand institutions (formal and non-for-
mal) which contribute to forming social interests and 
roles, social learning and the dissemination of norms.
As such, this book provides a bold overview of the 
overall logic of European integration which contains 
a welcome attempt to break out of the the traditional 
divide between rational and non-rational motives for 
political action, as well as the lack of scientific dia-
logue this has inspired. However, Jo’s toolbox remains 
mainly that of international relations. References to 
potentially useful other fields (political sociology, politi-
cal communication, sociology of nationalism, psychol-
ogy) are scarce or absent. Myths are described more 
as items of an history of ideas than as resources for 
mobilization, dissemination and legitimization. Do “the 
publicly held beliefs – that is European myths – of the 
European leaders who are experiencing the crisis” (p. 
59), studied through “big texts” really represent the de-
cisive pattern pf politics in the EU? Jo suggests links 
between ideational factors and cumulative decisions 
towards further integration using some convincing 
evidence by identifying regularities in different tempo-
ral and socio-cultural contexts. However, the role of 
myths for actors beyond the top elites, their effects 
on the masses, their ability to evolve in order to take 
on board modifcations, and mechanisms of collective 
learning are explained far less. The relationship be-
tween myths and historical shared experiences (for 
example the importance of Rome and Christiendom 
for contemporary political practice) is not proven. 
In summary, Jo’s book is a stimulant for those 
interested in pursuing the exploration of Europe’s 
integrative dynamics through examining its commu-
nicative and symbolic side. Where it succeeds less 
is in articulating ambitious theoretical frameworks to 
empirical research that reflects a more representa-
tive sample of all the levels of European governance. 
François Foret
Université Libre de Bruxelles
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Sergio Fabbrini. Compound Democracies: Why the 
United States and Europe are Becoming Similar. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007.
in his new book, Compound Democracies, Sergio Fab-
brini conducts a systematic and theoretical compari-
son of the political systems of the United States and 
the European Union.  Other theorists have considered 
comparing these two political entities but have stum-
bled over their differences in political development and 
their unique qualities and have shied away from sig-
nificant comparisons.  Fabbrini suggests that empha-
sizing the exceptional politics of the US and the Euro-
pean Union obstructs “systemic comparison” (p. 204) 
with other democratic states, leaving studies theoreti-
cally weak.  He states, “comprehension requires com-
parison, and comparison is only possible if analytical 
criteria are available to integrate those specificities 
into common typological families” (p. 204).  Although 
studying the EU as a unique case has produced much 
valuable information about its policies, Fabbrini argues 
that using the compound democracy model would al-
low a theoretical and more constructive comparison 
of the US and the EU and facilitate a better under-
standing of the functioning of both political systems. 
Fabbrini argues that “the EU and the US are similar 
because they are two different species of the same po-
litical genus: the compound democracy (p.3).   He has 
revived the term compound democracy from Madison 
and the Federalist Papers, and uses it as a theoretical 
framework to systematically compare the political sys-
tems of the US and the EU.  Compound democracies 
have both interstate (confederal, intergovernmental) 
and supra-state (federal, supranational) structures. 
Their complex governmental structures encourage 
compromise, with their established systems of sepa-
ration and diffusion of powers, vertically and horizon-
tally.  Fabbrini demonstrates that both the US and the 
EU have these characteristics. He provides a thor-
ough analysis of the governing structures and the his-
torical development of democracy in the US and in the 
EU, using the historical-institutional approach at the 
macro level and looking at the big picture to compare 
general features of the two polities.  Fabbrini is well 
qualified to conduct this comparison because he has 
a thorough knowledge of both American and Europe-
an politics, and his use of the comparative method to 
analyze the two systems provides a fresh approach 
to studying the development of the EU.  His analy-
sis of these two multi-level polities with their diffused 
powers also contributes to the study of democracy.
Fabbrini’s use of the compound democracy mod-
el provides a novel way to compare the EU and the 
US.  He is able not only to compare the similarities of 
the two systems, but also to analyze their differences 
more systematically.  Nevertheless, certain problems 
remain with his model, and Fabbrini sometimes push-
es his comparison of the two systems further than he 
can justify.  Despite similarities, the “states” in the US 
are hard to compare to the “nation/states” that make 
up the EU.  The EU’s problem with the democratic 
deficit is another example of a difficult hurtle for his 
paradigm to justify, and will certainly provoke much 
discussion about the validity of his comparison of 
the EU to the US.  Nevertheless, Fabbrini’s original 
use of the compound democracy model to compare 
the US and the EU provides a new way to under-
stand the EU’s future direction more systematically. 
Fabbrini’s use of the compound democracy para-
digm allows a more theoretical comparison of politics 
in the EU and the US than previous explanations. Be-
cause the book grounds the discussion of the EU’s 
development in a comparative framework, and pro-
vides well-reasoned arguments for comparing the EU 
to the US, it enriches EU studies beyond just policy-
making and enlargement. Its comparative perspec-
tive permits a clearer understanding not only of the 
challenges facing multi-unit and multi-level democra-
cies, but also of EU’s operating logic.  This book is an 
important addition to the literature on the European 
Union as it proposes a more theoretically grounded 
comparative focus advancing the field of EU studies.
Eleanor E. Zeff 
Drake University
Vivien Schmidt. Democracy in Europe: The EU and 
National Polities. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
from the prolific pen of Vivien Schmidt comes an-
other ambitious treatment of European politics, this 
time focused on the European Union’s “democratic 
deficit.” This volume centers on three ideas. First, the 
EU should not be compared normatively to national 
democracies, since it is a novel form of organization 
called a “regional state.” The EU is characterized by 
“shared sovereignty, variable boundaries, composite 
identity, highly compound governance, and fragment-
ed democracy split between government by and of the 
people at the national level and governance for and 
with the people at the EU level” (9, original empha-
sis). There is no European demos for the EU to be 
governed by or of, so we cannot ask it to be more 
responsive to standard electoral mechanisms. More-
over, the EU institutions are so thoroughly checked-
and-balanced that we should not be overly concerned 
about a lack of accountability. The EU governs for the 
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people in the sense of providing welfare-enhancing 
cooperation, and with the people—or rather, paren-
thetically, “(or at least some of the people)” (29)—
through various consultative mechanisms. The upshot 
of this first idea is that the democratic deficit does 
not lie in the institutional processes of the EU itself.
The second idea is that the EU is nonetheless alter-
ing national-level democracies, and that the democrat-
ic deficit arises at this level. Problems occur especially 
where there is a poor “fit” between national institutions 
and “Europeanization” pressures. Given the EU’s com-
pound nature, misfit is sharpest with the simplest, most 
centralized polities, like Britain and France. In these 
countries the EU ensures that national democracy can 
neither work nor be justified in its old practices and 
terms. While more compound polities like Germany and 
Italy have delegated the same powers to the EU, their 
politicians and citizens were accustomed to shared, 
negotiated governance, and encounter less direct 
challenges to their practices and ideals of democracy. 
Yet Schmidt does not quite locate the democratic 
deficit in an EU that undercuts certain national demo-
cratic processes. “The central problem for the EU,” 
she writes, “is not so much the changes in national 
democratic practices per se but that they have gone 
unrecognized and unaccepted” (36). The third and 
predominant idea in the book is that democracy de-
pends on certain kinds of discourse to justify institu-
tions and policies. The EU’s problem is not that politics 
in an EU-bound Britain or France are no longer demo-
cratic in some aggregate sense, but that national-level 
discourse has not adapted to justify the changed land-
scape to citizens. Especially in France and Britain, 
“national leaders have bungled their communicative 
role” (4). French leaders have placed first empha-
sis on the notion that the EU has enhanced French 
power, without ever recognizing its other effects. Brit-
ish leaders have generally sought to deny that much 
has changed. In both cases—and to lesser degrees 
across all EU countries—elites have not updated 
their communicative discourse to their altered polities.
The book provides neatly stylized overviews of a 
great range of institutions, policies, and national and 
EU history, and insightfully connects the burgeon-
ing literatures on Europeanization and democracy. 
At a broader level I suspect Schmidt might accept 
that it does a better job at posing important ques-
tions than in answering them in a satisfying way. 
On its first move—shifting analysis about prob-
lems in EU democracy to the national level—the book 
allows the reader to wonder just how much Schmidt 
wants or needs to insist that the EU institutions them-
selves are acceptably democratic. In order to direct 
our attention to problems in national discourse, she 
does not need to insist that there are no other prob-
lems in EU democracy. Her language alternates be-
tween rather absolute claims that the EU system re-
ally is democratic and more relative claims that the 
biggest problems in EU democracy lie at the national 
level. Either set of claims can fit with her main argu-
ment, but they have quite different implications for 
how we think about democracy in Europe overall.
This ambiguity is related to the project’s incomplete 
normative framework. If it effectively critiques many ar-
guments that the EU system itself is undemocratic, the 
book does not elaborate a positive vision of what democ-
racy should look like in a regional state. The passage in 
the conclusion that comes closest to doing so seems to 
leave us in an impasse. It admits that most moves that 
would encourage more consultation with the people—
one of the more obvious normative recommendations 
implied by this analysis—could also stymie the effec-
tiveness of EU decision-making for the people (270). 
On the more analytic side of the argument, if the 
book’s focus on the importance of discourse is per-
suasive to this reader, it does not tell us what kind of 
discourse will solve the EU’s problems, nor why we 
would expect today’s leaders to address that difficult 
task more seriously. In sum, the book adds up to an 
admirable breakdown of some of Europe’s democratic 
problems. In terms of what could or will be done about 
those problems, though, we are left with a mix of opti-
mism that the EU is (or can be) democratic but pessi-
mism that Europeans may not ever get that message.
Craig Parsons
University of Oregon
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